Holding assets in a Sui protocol means relying on more than the safeguards built into Move. In a report published on November 13, 2026, an author examined what Sui Move’s type system and verifier can guarantee—and identified five gaps that still need explicit checks: bits lost during shifts, signed values stored in unsigned integers, privileged functions without caller checks, unchecked object ownership, and older package versions that remain callable.
The author used vulnerabilities involving Cetus, Aftermath Finance, Typus Finance and Scallop to motivate verifiable Certora rules labeled P1–P4, then extended the approach to protocol invariants labeled P5–P8. The report also suggested testing these gaps with test_scenario and Sui Prover.
The practical lesson for anyone assessing a protocol’s security claims is to ask which properties were checked and under what assumptions. Formal verification depends on defining those properties first; the existence of a type system or a prover does not, by itself, establish that every relevant protocol rule was tested.