For people holding POL, the question is not whether the reported stolen funds can currently move. According to Odaily’s November 5, 2026 report, Polygon validators had already frozen the affected addresses. The question before Polygon governance was whether recovery should go further: could a hard fork remove balances from those addresses without their private keys?
Polymarket and Binance proposed a Polygon PoS mainnet hard fork that would zero out approximately 70.49 million POL in five addresses identified as attacker-controlled and credit the same amount to recovery addresses they designated. The proposal would leave total POL supply unchanged. The report valued the amount at about $6.7 million when describing the proposal and about $6.5 million elsewhere; these are estimates, not two separate sums.
The proposal followed two reported October 30 security incidents: a compromise of Polymarket’s frontend and a compromise of a Binance hot wallet. The report said validators froze four addresses linked to the Polymarket incident, holding 23.86 million POL, and one linked to the Binance incident, holding 46.63 million POL. It said Polymarket had sought the attacker’s cooperation without receiving a reply. According to the proposal as described in the report, the attacker also offered Polygon validators cash to unfreeze addresses; that allegation is attributed to the proposal, not independently established here.
As of the report’s publication at 21:00 Beijing time on November 5, the fork was a proposal, not an enacted change. Polymarket and Binance were due to present it at a Polygon protocol governance meeting at 22:30 that evening. The report said Polygon officials, relevant governance participants and core developers had not publicly stated positions at that point. It also said both companies had already fully compensated affected users themselves.
Freezing an address restricts transactions; the proposed fork would instead change recorded balances without a signature from the address’s private key. That distinction matters to anyone relying on self-custody: control of a key and the network’s rules for changing balances are separate trust boundaries. Polymarket and Binance said the proposed intervention would apply only to these incidents and should not establish a routine recovery mechanism.
Such interventions have precedents, though their circumstances differ. After The DAO exploit in 2016, Ethereum adopted a hard fork to direct funds to a refund contract, and opponents continued the original chain as Ethereum Classic. The report also cited Core Network’s announcement on November 2, 2026, of a hard fork to recover 68,146,177.22 CORE from three attacker-controlled addresses following an October 31 unauthorized withdrawal. Neither example establishes what Polygon would decide. At the November 5 reporting time, the practical point for POL holders was to distinguish the existing freeze from the proposed, still-undecided balance rewrite.